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THE POLITICS OF GLOBALIZING EXPATRIATE
ASSIGNMENTS: A TRANSACTION COST ANALYSIS
U ovom članku autori analiziraju političke i ekonomske aspekte zasebnih
oblika iseljeničkih asignacija u više domaćih i globalnih organizacija i
naglašavaju različite opasnosti po pravičnost iseljenika u tim organizacijama,
te raspravljaju i o rezultirajućoj razgranjenosti za hrvatsku iseljeničku politiku.
Introduction
In a recent review of human resource management (i.e. HRM) research issues,
Ferris, Hochwarter, Buckley, Horell-Cook & Frink (1999) examine the foundation
bases for the potential of human resource management to influence organizational
policies and outcomes. In this foundation assessment, two distinct aspects dominate
the field of HRM: economic and political aspects. While it seems intuitive to
correlate the efficiency logic of economics with the functional aspects of HRM, it
appears intuitively less appealing to relate organizational policies and outcomes to
the symbolic aspects of HRM. This line of reasoning is congruent with the past
views of political science researchers, such as Moe’s (1997) contention of inherent
inefficiency of politics and North’s (1990) assumption of zero transaction cost in
politics. However, Williamson (1999, 309) has recently persuasively shown that
the economic “efficiency reasoning can and does apply to politics.” Specifically,
Williamson argues that transaction cost analysis (i.e. TCA) represents the integrative
analytical framework for political and economic aspects of comparative institutional
analysis.
Building on Williamson’s insight and applying the suggested method, we
examine both political and economic aspects of expatriation policy and practice in
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multinational corporations (i.e. MNCs) in a coherent analytical manner. Our
objectives in this paper are to: 1) examine the latest revisions of transaction cost
analysis and explain its applicability to analysis of expatriation transaction; 2)
analyze hazards and governance mechanisms related to specific structural
alternatives in expatriate assignments; and 3) introduce the political transaction
value variable of probity and apply it to devise a governance mechanism for
expatriate assignments in MNCs.
Transaction Cost Analysis of Expatriate Assignments
The theory of transaction cost analysis is grounded in the “combined
ramifications of bounded rationality and opportunism in conjunction with a condition
of asset specificity” (Williamson, 1985, 42). The combined ramifications are related
to the specification of appropriate governance form necessary to efficiently channel
transactions (Williamson, 1991). How specific discrete governance forms will be
determined depends on the interaction between asset specificity-related holdup
(i.e. behavioral uncertainty) and the uncertainty in the environment (i. e. natural
uncertainty) (Williamson, 1991, Williamson, 1996).
This complex nature of this interaction can be captured in transaction cost
analysis by analyzing the three common transaction attributes - asset specificity,
uncertainty and frequency. The variations in these attributes cause undesired effects,
which entail increased transaction costs. Economizing on transaction costs leads
to discrete alternative modes of governance, which support different kinds of
adaptation. For example, the market mode supports autonomous adaptation
encouraging independence and enterprise of exchange parties. In contrast, hierarchy
supports internal cooperation encouraging compliance and task/mission orientation
(Milgram & Roberts, 1988, Milgram & Roberts, 1992). In summary, transaction
cost economics provides a framework for comparative institutional analysis to design
efficient governance structures, which secure order and prevent conflict in exchange,
thus creating opportunity for the exchange parties to realize mutual gains
(Williamson & Masten, 1995).
The seeming inherent deficiency in application of TCA in past international
management research relative to comparative institutional analysis has been the
asymmetric assumption that “failure” of the structural alternative of hierarchy is
less likely than that of market (Teece, 1986). To address this shortcoming, a
symmetric assumptions of equal likelihood of hierarchy and market failure is
introduced in the latest revision of TCA because “efficiency needs to be assessed
in terms of a common transaction” (Williamson, 1999, 310), when comparing “social
arrangements which are all more or less failures” (Coase, 1992, 717). The symmetric
assumption implies that the discrete structural alternatives should not be compared
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in absolute terms, but rather using a “remediableness criterion,” suggested by
Williamson. Per this criterion, a surviving mode of organization is presumed efficient
if no superior alternative can be devised and implemented in comparative
institutional competition. The introduction of this criterion extends TCA beyond
the static choice among alternative modes of organization toward analyzing the
dynamic transaction costs to capture additional organizational purposes (i.e.
economizing) and additional instruments (i.e. governance), as the organization
“moves” (Williamson, 1998). In sum, the use of the remediableness criterion implies
that no more real markets are compared to ideal hierarchies, but real markets to
real hierarchies (Coase, 1964).
The remediableness criterion of TCA can be used to examine the efficiency
of expatriating individuals from domestic organization, as the continuing mode of
international assignments. Expatriation is used extensively in multinational
corporations (i.e. MNCs) in their international human resource management (i.e.
IHRM) practice. In the analysis performed in this study, we view an expatriate as a
firm’s cross-border agent who works under specific incentive and adjustment
systems. We adopt a widespread agreement that the form of an international
assignment is defined by the assignee’s employment relationship relative to the
home country (i. e. domestic) organization (Dowling, Schuler & Welch, 1999). In
general, expatriates can be parent country nationals (i. e. PCNs) and third-country
nationals (i. e. TCNs).
There is an ample body of past IHRM research that has produced mixed
findings about the efficiency of the expatriation programs in particular and the
corporate HR expatriate policies in general (Kobrin, 1988, Oddou & Mendenhall,
1991, Hartzing, 1995, Sargent & Matthews, 1998, Beamish & Inkpen, 1998).
However, these researchers may have ignored the point that alternative modes might
have been considered, but not ratified by the MNC’s top management team (i. e.
TMT). The reason for not endorsing the alternative staffing options was that the
TMT’s political interests were not perceived as being advanced. To analyze how
specific expatriate assignment practices are addressed in MNCs, we need to examine
both political and economic attributes of the transactions associated with various
modes of expatriate assignments. Also, we need to assess how the attributes of
these transactions differ between organizations operating in a multi-domestic context
from those operating in a global context (Prahalad & Oostervald, 1999).
In this examination, it is important to bear in mind that the corporate HR
function in a multinational organization is primarily policy-oriented (i.e. with
emphasis on HR dependability, relevant for the legitimacy market) and secondarily
strategy-oriented (i.e. with emphasis on HR competence, relevant to the product
and labor markets) (Laurent, 1986). The primary aspect of the HR function is
deliberately crafted to be administrative and protect TMT from any legalistic threats
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that may arise from employment relationships in multiple institutional environments.
The secondary aspect of the HIZ function is to devise efficient use of human
resources in the organization (Pucik, 1992). In this dual capacity, the corporate HR
may be thought of as not having real market for its services because the corporate
HR contractual relationships are non-standard and non-competitive (Ferris, Perrewe,
Anthony & Gilmore, 2000). The transactions evolving within such a mixed political
and economic relationship are referred to as sovereign transactions (Wilson, 1989).
Of particular interest for this study, are the dualities of corporate relationships with
foreign subsidiaries that involve the IHRM-specific sovereign transactions associated
with various forms of expatriate assignments (Evans & Doz, 1992). Both in multi-
-domestic and global organizations, these transactions are exposed to not only
economic but also political hazards (Gregerson, Hite & Black, 1996).
Political Hazards to Transactions Associated with Expatriate
Assignment In MNCs
In multi-domestic organizations, the boundaries between subsidiaries and
between the  ssociated expatriate assignments are often rigid and non-permeable
(Birkinshaw & Morrison, 1995). The exchange monitored and facilitated by
expatriates is predominantly vertical in nature (i. e. occurring between the domestic
headquarters and foreign subsidiaries)  irkinshaw & Hood, 1998). These activities,
characterized by sovereign transactions, may be exposed to specific contractual
hazards (Rugman & Verbeke, 1992). The most salient contractual hazards that affect
sovereign transactions in the domestic organization-foreign subsidiary exchange,
beyond the standard economic hazards associated with asset specificity and
operating costs of expatriation (i.e. specialized non traditional training and
development through unique social conditioning), are the so far unexamined political
hazards. Williamson’s (1999) argues that the most relevant political hazards are
those to probity. Probity is an attribute specific to sovereign transactions, which
refers to the assignee’s integrity and rectitude in accomplishing missions (Wilson,
1989, Williamson, 1993).
Probity implies a high standard of individual expatriate’s integrity when
accomplishing the task assigned relative to a foreign country with professional
excellence and in concert with the policies of the coiporate TMT. This means that
the expatriate assignees should exhibit a reliable responsiveness to the TMT’s
demands and accomplish such assigned tasks in a goal-congruent, timely, competent,
yet not over-zealous manner. The relevance of probity comes from the “small-
-number but yet high-impact” possibility that an expatriate, with an assigned
responsibility for a strategically important country market, may cause such a high
level of damage to the multi-domestic organization’s reputation that cannot be
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prevented by any comparable design of punishment. In other words, expatriate
assignments are often associated with the provision and use of delicate information,
the leakage of which to competitors/customers/third parties (i.e. such as government
agencies) could have enormous organizational costs and decrease the bargaining
power of the MNC in the host country markets.
When devising and administrating expatriate assignment modes to channel
these sovereign transactions, corporate )HRM in a multi-domestic organization
should be aware of the associated twifying principles of probity relative to expatriate
assignments. The unifying principles of probity include: (1) abiding respect for the
mission of the assignment; (2) reliable and non-zealous responsiveness to TMT
initiatives; and (3) accurate communication to the counterparts associated with the
mission of the assignment (Williamson, 1999). Based on these principles, the history
of socialization (i.e. social conditioning), preparatory training, and formal reporting
procedures are designed as the safeguards to mitigate the hazards to probity in
expatriate assignments. In addition, the formal TMT power and the informal HR
power to appoint and remove expatriates are explicitly stated in corporate policies
to ensure proper attention and responsiveness of candidates to their expatriate
assignments (Murphy & Stroh, 1997).
Hazards to probity could manifest themselves if (1) the corporate TMT and
IHRM lacked confidence in the reliability of the information and assessments that
were provided by expatriates (i.e. expatriates are not considered dependable to
accomplish the task) and/or (2) if assignees are perceived incompetent to implement
corporate initiatives in local country markets in a quality manner (Kobrin, 1988;
Gregersen & Black, 1995). In particular, an expatriate’s opportunistic behavior
(i.e. in terms of “dual” commitment to both the headquarters and the foreign
subsidiary) may arise when the TMT’s long-term general interests and expatriate
short-term specific interests in corporate or subsidiary initiatives are inconsistent
(Black, Morrison & Crregersen, 2000).
If there is concern about the possible lack of competence and/or dependability
of expatriate candidates to execute the assigned task, the selection process poses a
particular hazard to probity of human assets in international assignments (Black,
Gregersen, Mendenhall & Stroh, 1998). This uncertainty naturally arises from the
idiosyncratic nature of the expatriate assignment transaction in a multi-domestic
organization, for which ex ante probity is very important: 1) long duration of an
average assignment (i.e. 3 years); and 2) dependence on a candidate’s undivided
loyalty in the face of challenges imposed by the local subsidiary and lucrative
offers from the organization’s competitors (Black, Gregersen, Mendenhall & Stroh,
1999). These challenges are particularly tempting to the horizontally expatriated
TCNs. The TCNs often develop cognitive specialization and reputation working in
difficult markets, while facing much lower exit barriers than PCNs (Boyacigiller,
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1990). An ideal, yet not very realistic way to deal with this possibility of the breach
of contract of probity is to enact a strong corporate culture as an institutional
framework in which such a breach is viewed as a corporate betrayal publicized to
jeopardize the opportunistic candidate’s reputation in internal and external labor
markets (Daniels & Insch, 1998). If such symbolic and coercive measures are
devised, they are likely to work only for PCNs.
Proposition 1. The greater the ex ante probity requirements for international
assignments in MNCs the more likely the focus on PCNs rather
than on TCNs for expatriate assignment in spite of the higher
operating costs.
In view of the contractual hazards to probity that are a PCN expatriate
assignment specific, the corporate IHRM function must devise appropriate
governance mechanisms to channel these sovereign transactions. In general, standard
organizational mechanisms of expatriate governance are described in terms of (1)
incentive intensity; (2) administrative controls; and (3) employment relationship
(Williamson, 1985). The appropriate governance mechanism for sovereign corporate
HR transactions relative to the PCN expatriation, includes: (1) low powered
incentives to deter expatriate enterprise and zeal for myopic actions; (2) formalized
administrative protocols to ensure probity and communicate credibility; and (3)
employment contract that favors termination for cause over termination at will
(Williamson, 1996). When this insight to the politics of PCN expatriate assignments
in multi-domestic organizations is examined in more detail, it implies that the
appropriate governance of these sovereign transactions involves salaried
compensation, protoco-driven communication, and secure employment for
expatriates. In other words, because the headquarters politics “rules” in multi-
-domestic organizations, the “ethnocentric” expatriate assignments become very
prestigious and privileged positions in the organization. In such internal environment,
expatriate assignees favor “local” rather than cosmopolitan career orientation. In
doing so, the expatriates earn the “red badge of courage” for their successful
completion of a foreign assignment (Novičević & Harvey, 2000). Thus, the formal
and substantive aspects of the expatriate assignment merge, and are viewed as a
“whole” by TMT and corporate IHRM. As a result, expatriates will enact generally
cautious actions over autonomous directives benefiting the subsidiary and in general,
consensus-building activities over specific local issue advocacy. Therefore, in
political multi-domestic environments, expatriates are reluctant to expand their
responsibility in the course of the assignment beyond executing the originally
executing the original established by the IHRM. This type of corporate environment
and expatriate attitude is common in multi-domestic organizations because
subsidiary interdependence is low and the initiatives to integrate international
assignees into global teams or to expand their mandates are seldom put in place.
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Political Hazards to Transactions Associated with Expatriate Assignments
In Global Organizations
As the MNC increases the degree of integration of its worldwide activities,
which requires the development of a global management mindset, the need for
decentralization of corporate authority increases changing the nature of corporate
intent for expatriate assignments (Marschan, Welch & Welch, 1997). In particular,
the globalization processes engender an increased number of assignments and shift
the focus of performance appraisal for expatriate assignments toward outcomes,
thus influencing the processes in the IHRM assignment-related politics (Spender,
1992). As a result, no longer promotions are awarded only to those expatriates that
excel as passive controllers patiently working within the rules (i.e. long-term
expatriates). Rather, an international assignee of a global organization needs to be
more a “player” (i.e. a risk-taking decision-maker) because greater responsiveness
and greater entrepreneurship in the local market context are more valued (Welch &
Welch, 1993). Therefore, expatriates in a global organization are no longer primarily
viewed as members of an elitist group representing the legitimate power of the
headquarters. Rather, their ex ante probity (i.e. political integrity) to the mission of
the assignment becomes less important than their ex post probity (i.e. political
expediency) to get the things done in the local context (i.e. political skills rather
than political traits are required as they have to know more in terms of competence
and control less in terms of dependability).
As the extent of globalization of the organization’s business activities increases,
its knowledge bases become more dispersed and its growth shifts toward emerging
markets. As a result, the corporate TMT is less in a position to impose ex ante
political rules and procedures from the home country headquarters because: (1) it
lacks the experience with horizontal coordination and with doing business in
emerging markets; (2) it is imperfectly informed about the interdependencies
affecting local needs; (3) it faces a turbulent rate of change taking place in multiple
markets, competitive strategies, and technologies; (4) it is exposed to a political
risk of formulating inappropriate strategies for knowledge transfer and emerging
markets thus creating a negative goodwill and reducing the likelyhood for success
of future actions; and (5) it encounters sheer ignorance of how to develop local
relationships in emerging markets in transition because of scarce social capital to
instantiate such relationships (O’Driscoll & Rizo, 1995, Holm, Johanson &
Thilenius, 1995, Harvey & Novičević, 2000). Therefore, the task of the traditional
expatriate assignment has to be changed, as well as the mechanisms of internal
governance in order to align the associated transactions accordingly. In global
organizations dispersing knowledge capital globally and entering emerging markets,
the governance shifts toward: (1) greater incentive intensity to stimulate the risk-
-taking behavior of expatriates; (2) less complete admmistrative controls because
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of the assignment task innovations; and (3) less protected careers of expatriates
because of organizational “delayering” (Doz & Prahalad, 1986). As a result, cost
control is more emphasized, the ex ante rigidity of probity partially “sacrificed”,
and human specificity somewhat decreased (Gould, 1999). Moreover, the expatriates
in a global organization face more frequent demands for innovation of the assigned
role than the expatriates in multi domestic organizations do because of the increased
subsidiary development and interdependence in global organizations (Bartlett &
Ghoshal, 1986, Forsgren & Pahlberg, 1992, Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998).
Faced with the disturbances of globalization (i.e. the “boonrand-busts” of
global capital markets), discontinuities of emerging markets (i.e. one billion people
abruptly joining the world market economy in the 1990s), as well as the dramatic
increase in cross-border knowledge transfer and intelligent IT connectivity, for
which coordinated adaptations are needed, a global organization has to select the
mode of governance that is best suited to effect a coordinated adaptation through
expatriate assignments under these challenging conditions (Prahalad & Oostervald,
1999). The changed nature of the IHRM expatriation-related sovereign transactions
needs to be examined as they evolve from more dynamic domestic organization
foreign subsidiary interactions under the forces of globalization and the shift of the
organizational growth toward emerging markets. Under the dynamic domestic
organization foreign subsidiary interactions, information inputs, decision-making
and implementation processes become overlapping and interdependent (Argyis &
Liebeskind, 1999). This complexity necessitates activities of composite transactions,
whose attributes posing specific challenges to the extant mode of expatriation that
relies on PCNs as the “preferred” candidate pool.
The dynamic TCA posits that human mind is a specialized rather than general
problem solver, capable of sensing and recognizing opportunistic behavior, personal
integrity, and specialist competence of other economic actors (Williamson, 1998).
This cognitive specialization is enhanced in organizations, but varies among
individuals. Therefore, organizations should be regarded as instruments for utilizing
varying competences of human actors in terms of personal probity (i.e.
dependability) and cognitive specialization (i.e. competence). This means that more
principled and competent expatriates should be assigned to difficult and risky
projects and markets (i.e. to manage the interfaces where cooperation is most
critical). The more dynamic (i.e. in terms of changing and underdeveloped standards)
and complex the project and the specific market in which the organization operates
and competes, the more this shift in expatriate assignment needs is salient.
Specifically, the need for competence shifts from standard knowledge to differential
learning, and that for probity, from past oriented integrity to future-oriented
expediency (i.e. differential probity).
Selecting and training expatriates for cognitive abilities and resilience to
opportunism is particularly important when the markets and projects involve non
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separable contractual and technological activities, containing composite transactions
or clusters of transactions (i.e. routines). Then besides high selectivity and intensive
development, additional instruments must be implemented for efficient coordination
of composite transactions, such as option-based compensation and social/team
conditioning. As Williamson (1998) argues that dynamic TCA of composite
transactions must take a system view, we must analyze both (1) assignees (i.e. in
terms of varying competence and probity) and (2) assignment activities (i.e. with
differential needs for cognitive and probity supports). Economizing on assignments
will be realized by assembling expatriates into teams in which members “bid” into
their most productive uses/alignments. As teams are embedded in formal and
informal constraints of organizational and institutional cultures, the system view
of dynamic TCA must also take into consideration individual members’
competencies and preferences for teamwork.
Therefore, the dynamism of a rapidly globalizing organization requires that a
new collective staffmg alternative is added in order to provide competent and
dependable learning from expatriate assignments. To accumulate and retain such a
human capital of heterogeneous cross-border political skills, the global organization
has to expand its recruiting base of international assignees suspending PCNs as a
default mode.
Proposition 2. The greater the ex past probity (i.e. political expediency)
requirements for international assignments in globalizing MNCs
the more likely the equal focus on PCNs, and TCNs for global
assignments and on assembling them into global teams.
Governance Mechanism for Global Assignments in MNCs
Table 1 shows the attributes of appropriate governance mechanism for each
structural alternative of global/expatriate assignments: (1) third-country national -
TCN (market mode), (2) Global teams (hybrid mode); and (3) PCN (hierarchy
mode).
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Table 1.
PROBITY-MODERATED GOVERNANCE MECHANISM FOR GLOBAL
EXPATRIATE ASSIGNMENTS
Governance Attributes                ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF GLOBAL
                      EXPATRIATE ASSIGNMENTS
Market Hybrid Hierarchy
Third Country Global Teams PCN
National
I. INSTRUMENTS H M L
    (a) Incentive intensity
    (b) Administrative controls L M H
II. PERFORMANCE
      ATTRIBUTES
     (a) Adaptive autonomy H M L
     (b) Adaptive  integrity L M H
III. EMPLOYMENT
      RELATIONSHIP
       (a) Job autonomy H M L
      (b) Job security L M H




As shown in Table 1, the TCN altemative (“contracting out” an expatriate
assignment position away from the domestic organization) requires the strongest
incentive intensity and is least susceptible to administrative controls as the TCN
has the least propensity to behave cooperatively. The PCN is the polar opposite of
the TCN in all aspects, while the global team form is located in between these two
polar choices along all dimensions/attributes. Table 1 illustrates how the relaxation
of safeguards to ex ante probity hazards (i.e. political integrity), which played the
dominant role in the IHRM decisions in multi-domestic organizations increases
IHRM power to delegate (contract out) expatriate assignment responsibility to
individuals originating from outside the home country organization (i.e. resolving
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the inherent difficulty in discharging sovereign transactions across different
institutional systems).
The relaxation of safeguards to allow ex post probity in global organizations
(i.e. the shift from the rigid trait of political integrity to the dynamic skill of political
expediency) is very important for the “corporate deregulation” of sovereign
transactions in general and for the development of global teams in particular.
Specifically, the rigid ex ante requirement impedes strategic flexibility that is
necessary in dynamic and reciprocal relationships specific to global organizations.
Whereas PCNs ensure dependability, they lack competence necessary for local
political expediency, which is indispensable for integration of globally dispersed
knowledge and responsiveness in unknown institutional systems. The polar opposite
to PCNs - the TCN structural alternative - ensures expediency but not integrity.
Therefore, when the tasks requiring strategic flexibility of decentralized global
leadership in global organizations are in question, the decision relative to expatriate
assignments focuses on the issue how to implement decentralization when the
integrity-expediency continuum of probity is operative in this decision process of
globalizing expatriate assignments (i.e. developing global assignments). Of course,
other variables may affect this decision-maldng process: 1) endogenous (firm size,
strategy and structure, life cycle, intemational experience, entry mode and internal
networks); 2) exogenous (industry structure, life cycle, and external networks);
and country-specific (socioeconomic development, culture, political risk, and GDP
dependence on FDl) (Schuler, 2000).
Conclusions
In this study, we have assumed that expatriate assignments may represent
discrete political structural choices, which is consistent with literature on discrete
choice found in both economics and organization theory. Each form of expatriate
assignment (i.e. TCNs, global teams, and PCNs) is described in this study as
configured around a set of transaction attributes, of which the political attribute of
probity is most salient. Focusing in this study on the transaction cost of the assignee
political integrity and expediency, we have provided a formal theoretical explanation
how and why multi-domestic and global organizations select different structural
altematives for expatriate assignments.
In symmary, our analysis has shown that expatriating PCNs may be considered
an efficient extant default practice in multi-domestic organizations, where the
political factor of rigid ex ante probity is critical in transaction cost reasoning.
However, in global organizations, the default use of PCNs becomes sub-functional
unless complemented with global teams and TCNs. In general, we may infer that
the processes of globalization, deregulation and technological interconnectivity
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may accelerate the “commodification” of the PCN-specific probity demands and
contribute to the hierarchy “Taihxre” of this mode.
The future development of transaction cost analyses will likely lead to the
evolution of “dynamic transaction cost” economics and politics (MacLeod,
1999:345). The politics of bureaucracy is inevitably “engineered” into the economics
of expatriate assignment forms as the fum increases the scope of its
internationalization. In this study, we have explained how this process evolves by
employing Williamson’s (1999) new conceptualization of the remediableness
criterion. The introduction of the remidiableness criterion allows the transaction
cost approach not only to predict why some exchanges would be taken out of the
market, but also to predict the reverse process (i.e. the symmetric assumption is
introduced). The concept of remediableness is “explicitly dynamic in the sense
that it is used to evaluate current organizational forms relative to currently feasible
alternatives” (MacLeod, 1999: 347). Viewing the evolution of transaction costs as
an innovative process suggests that the shift of the extant hierarchical mode of
PCN expatriate assignments toward network (i.e. global teams) and market modes
(i.e TCNs) is a practical illustration of the remdiableness criteria.
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POLITIKA GLOBALIZACIJSKIH ISELJENIČKIH ASIGNACIJA: ANALIZA
TRANSAKCIJSKIH TROŠKOVA
Sažetak
Članak analizira političke i ekonomske aspekte zasebnih oblika iseljeničkih
asignacija u više domaćih i globalnih organizacija. Analiza transakcijskih troškova
političke varijable pravičnosti koristi se da bi se pokazalo kako je svaki oblik
iseljeničke asignacije poravnan s različitim poticajnim intenzitetom na različit način.
Naročito naglašavaju različite opasnosti po pravičnost iseljenika u više domaćih i
globalnih organizacija i raspravljaju o rezultirajućoj razgranjenosti za hrvatsku
iseljeničku politiku.
